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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
wherein this doctrine is applied, are in accord with the principal
case."
It is believed that the instant case represents a tendency
toward absolute liability predicated upon ownership alone for the
negligent operation of the automobile by a third person. A few
states have by statute practically achieved this result.1
2
CRIMINAL LAW - INDICTMENT AS ACCESSORY BEFORE THE
FACT HELD SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION AS PRINCIPAL. -
Defendant, indicted as an accessory before the fact to murder,
was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. From an order of the
trial court discharging defendant on a writ of habeas corpus, the
sheriff brought error. Held, that an indictment for accessory be-
fore the fact to murder will sustain a conviction of voluntary man-
slaughter. Judgment reversed. Moore v. Lowe, Sheriff.1
The principal case purports to apply by analogy the rule of
State v. Prater- to the effect that a verdict of manslaughter under
a murder indictment, where the evidence is compatible only with
murder or innocence, will not be reversed. The thought is that
the accused should not be permitted to complain of the propensity
of the compassionate jury to convict of a lesser offense than the
evidence warrants.' As a matter or practical administration of
criminal law, the doctrine is not without merit. It involves, how-
head of the family, supporting his wife and himself, and who maintained the
car and who at the time of the accident was using it in his own business."
In an earlier decision, however, this same court had applied the family car
doctrine where a minor son was driving the family car. See King v. Smythe,
140 Tenn. 217, 204 S. E. 296 (1918).
'I Steele v. Ages' Adm'x, 233 Ky. 714, 26 S. E. 653 (1930); Venghis v.
Nathanson, 101 N. J. L. 110, 127 Atl. 175 (1925).
12 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1741 'A provides: "Every owner of a motor vehicle shall
be liable and responsible for the death of or injury to persons or property
resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle, in the business
of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with
the permission, express or implied, of such owner." In the case of O'Neil v.
Williams, 127 Cal. App. 385, 15 Pac. (2d) 879 (1932), this statute was applied
and the wife held liable on facts similar to those of the principal case. For
similar statutes see Codes of Michigan, Connecticut and New York. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 1572; New York, CAHILL'S CONSOL. LAws (1930) c. 69A, § 59;
Micu. Co P. LAws (1915) § 4125.
1 180 S. E. 1 (W. Va. 1935).
2 52 W. Va. 132, 143, 43 S. E. 230 (1930).
" A defendant cannot be heard to complain of an error in his favor. State
v. Johnson, 111 W. Va. 653, 164 S. E. 31 (1932); State v. Prater, supra n. 2.
1
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ever, the assumption, in direct contradiction to the verdict, that
the defendant is guilty of the crime alleged in the indictment, thus
constituting the appellate court final arbiter of evidentiary facts
which a jury has previously found insufficient. When, as in the
instant case, the record is not before the court,4 so that guilt is
presumed solely from the verdict, the possibility of error is partic-
ularly apparent.
The common law regarded accessoryship and the principal
crime as fundamentally distinct substantive offenses.8 In con-
sequence, on the ground that an indictment must inform the de-
fendant of the nature of the charge against him, G an allegation of
one would not sustain a conviction of the other, the resulting var-
iance being considered fatal.7 Although some jurisdictions have by
statute completely abolished this common law distinction, 8 stat-
utes, which merely provide that an accessory shall be treated as
a principal for purposes of venue8 and punishment,10 have been
held implicitly to retain the difference for the purpose of indict-
ment. 1  Despite loose expressions in State V. Elliso 2 -and Weil
v. Black3 suggesting a contrary result, the previous construction
4 Moore v. Lowe, Sheriff, supra n. 1 at 2.
5Hatley v. State, 15 Ga. 346 (1854); Reggins v. State, 116 Ga. 592, 42
S. E. 707 (1902); State v. Wyckoff, 31 N. J. L. 65 (1864). (The above cases
arose on the question of the sufficiency of the indictment to sustain conviction).
In State v. Larkin, 49 N. H. 36 (1869); State v. Buzzell, 58 N. H. 257 (1878);
and Morrow v. State, 14 Lea 475 (Tenn. 1884), a plea of double jeopardy was
interposed after acquittal of one offense. 1 East, P. C. 352. See State v.
Roberts, 50 W. Va. 422, 425, 40 S. E. 484 (1901); State v. Cremeans, 62 W.
Va. 134, 137, 57 S. E. 405 (1907). See 4 BL. CoMM. (11th ed. 1791) 40, to
the effect that despite indictment and acquittal as accessory there may be
subsequent indictment as principal.
8 One object of the indictment is to furnish the accused with such descriptior
of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense. State v.
Parkersburg Brewing Co., 53 W. Va. 591, 594, 45 S. E. 924 (1903); State v.
Wohlmuth, 78 W. Va. 404, 408, 89 S. E. 7 (1916); State v. Vaughan, 97
W. Va. 563, 125 S. E. 583 (1924); W. Va. Const. (1872) art. 3, § 14.
7 Carter v. State, 106 Ga. 372, 32 S. E. 345 (1899) ; State v. Wyckoff, supra
n. 5; Thornton v. Comm., 24 Gratt. 65 (Va. -1874); State .v. Roberts, supra
n. 5; State v. Cremeans, supra n. 5.
6-Representative cases indicate that statutes in some states have completely
abolished the distinction for all purposes. People v. Nolan, 144 Cal. 75, 77
Pac. 774 (1904); McCracken v. People, 209 Ill. 215, 70 N. E. 749 (1904);
State v. Smith, 106 Ia. 701, 77 N. W. 499 (1898); People v. Mills, 178 N. Y.
974, 70 N. E. 786 (1904); Brandt v. Comm., 94 Pa. 290 (1880).
9W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 61, art. 11, § 7.
2b W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 61, art. 11, § 6.
" Smith v. State, 37 Ark. 274 (1881) ; State v. Ricker, 29 Me. 84 (1848);
Sandage v. State, 61 Neb. 240, 84 N. W. 35 (1901); Barnett v. State, 46 Tex.
Cr. App. 459, 80 S. W. 1013 (1904); Hatchett v. Comm., 75 Va. 925 (1882).
12 49 W. Va. 70, 38 S. E. 574 (1901).
J3 76 W.,Va. 685, 86 S. E. 666 (1916). See Syl. 5, "Sees ....... Code ...... , in
effect, abolish the common law distinction between an accessory before th
2
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of the local statute would seem to place it in the latter group.
Prior to the instant case it was apparently settled law in West
Virginia that an indictment as a principal would not sustain a
conviction for an accessory. 4 It is difficult to -reconcile this rule
with the present holding.
DEEDs - ESTOPPEL - CONFIRMATION OF MARRIED WOMAN'S
CONVEYANCE. - W, living apart from her husband, executed an
oil and gas lease of her own realty in 1930 for four years and as
long thereafter as oil and gas should be produced, but did not
acknowledge it in the form required by the West Virginia stat-
ute.' In 1931 the statute was changed so as to permit a married
woman to execute a deed as if she were a single woman.2  The
lessee paid delay rentals until 1933, when W executed a deed pur-
porting to lease the same property to the plaintiffs, who brought
this action to enjoin the former lessee from operating. Held, that
although in the view of the court the lease of 1930 was void,
" W
and her assignees were estopped to deny the validity of that lease.
Hanley v. Richards.4
Although the result reached by the court is palpably sound,
it seems that a consistent use of terms strictly applied would not
permit "estoppel" to give this "void" deed effect as a convey-
ance.' This result might well have been attained by treating the
fact and a principal felon, by making such accessory, in every felony, punish-
able as if he were the principal in the first degree, and punishable in the
county in which the principal felon might be indicted."
14 State v. Roberts, supra n. 5; State v. Cremeans, supra n. 5; see State v.
Lilly, 47 W. Va. 496, 497, 35 S. E. 837 (1900); State v. Powers, 91 W. Va.
737, 747, 113 S. E. 912 (1922).
1 W. VA. CODE (1923) c. 73, § 6
2 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 3, § 3.
• 'Bennett v. Pierce, 45 W. Va. 654, 31 S. E. 972 (1898).
4178 S. E. 805 (W. Va. 1935).
"W. VA. REv. Copn (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 1: "No estate of inheritance
or freehold, or for a term of more than five years, in lands, or any other inter-
est or term therein of any duration under which the whole or any part of the
corpus of the estate may be taken, destroyed, or consumed, except for domestic
use, shall be created or conveyed unless by deed or will." A lease of land
for the purpose of extracting oil or natural gas is, in effect, a grant of a part
of the corpus of the land. Haskell v. Sutton, 53 W. Va. 206, 44 S. E. 533
(1903).
In Drake v. O'Brien, 83 W. Va. 678, 99 S. E. 280 (1919), the lessee took
possession under a parol oil and gas lease and paid the royalties for many
years. The court held it to be an implied tenancy from year to year, saying
it could not be more than that, for lack of deed or will creating it. In 1931
3
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